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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LYNN R. PREECE,

)
)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

)
)
)

vs.
MARK

v.

)
)

PREECE,

Case No. 18295

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant and
Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action of divorce by Lynn R. Preece, Plaintiff
and Appellant (herein called Appellant) against Mark

v.

Preece, Defendant and Respondent (herein called Respondent).
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
A divorce trial was held on October 27, 1981, where
personally appeared the Appellant and her attorney and the
Respondent and his attorney.

The Court, at the conclusion

of the trial, granted a Decree of Divorce to Appellant
setting forth the terms to be included therein, waiving the
interlocutory period and making the same final upon signing.
Appellant's attorney prepared the Findings of Facts, Conclusions
of Law and Decree and mailed those to counsel for the Respondent.
Respondent's attorney questioned one provision in the Findings
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as not being a part of the oral order of the court, and
submitted the documents by letter to the trial judge for
signature with a request that the paragraph in question in
the Findings be deleted.

There was no concern regarding the

wording of the Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.
Before the trial court could decide whether the paragraph in
question in the Findings of Fact should be included or not,
the Respondent died.

Counsel for the Respondent petitioned

the Court for a judgment nunc pro tune, which the Court,
after oral argument by the attorneys for the parties, granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to enforce the judgment nunc pro tune
of the Divorce Decree granted by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on March 4, 1976 (Trial Transcript,
p. 3), it being the Appellant's fourth marriage (Trial
Transcript, p. 26) and the Respondent's third marriage
(Trial Transcript, p. 26).

Appellant sold land that she

owned in Weber County, Utah prior to the marriage and from
the net equity of $7,800 helped to purchase a trailer home
in which the parties lived with their separate families by
prior marriages on a family farm which the Respondent operated
in Cache County, Utah (Trial Transcript, pp. 4-5).

The farm

in Cache County, Utah where the trailer was located was land
where Respondent had been born and was acquired by the
Respondent in a deed from his parents in 1975 wherein his
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parents retained life estate interests (Trial Transcript p.
10).

Appellant knew how title was held at the time of the

marriage (Trial Transcript, p. 28).

Respondent's mother

died on June 26, 1977 (Trial Transcript, p. 49), and his
father died on February
50).

a,

1979 (Trial Transcript pp. 29 and

Appellant's name was never placed on the title of the

land (Trial Transcript, p. 20).

The parties separated

August 1, 1979, (Trial Transcript, p. 17) and had not even
seen each other since August of 1980 (Trial Transcript, p.
65).

Appellant requested the divorce be finalized immediately

(Trial Transcript, p. 4} and testified there was no- possibility
of reconciliation (Trial Transcript, p. 21).

The farmland

was appraised for the divorce trial as worth $143,000 as of
the time of the divorce trial (Ex. 3).

Any increase in the

value of the land from the time of the marriage to the time
of separation and later the divorce was due to natural
appreciation (Ex. 3).
The Court, after hearing all the evidence, granted a
decree of divorce, making the same final on signing, and
made an order relative to the return of certain property,
awarded to Appellant a judgment for her investment in
certain items of personal property and a share of the natural
appreciation of the land during the time the parties lived
together, restored to Appellant her prior married name,
ordered Respondent to assume certain debts, and ordered each
party to pay their own expenses and costs (Trial Transcript,

p. 79-84).
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Appellant's counsel mailed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree which he had prepared on November 12 1981.
Respondent's attorney received the documents on November 14,
1981 (see p. 34 of Court's file).

Respondent's attorney

mailed those documents to his client for his review before
approval and received a call from Respondent several days
later indicating that the Respondent had been ill and hospitalized
with a jaundice problem, so arrangements were made for the
Respondent and his attorney to visit at the hospital for
Respondent to review the papers, approve them as to form
and better understand the Order.

Everything was agreed in

the papers as to form except for paragraph 9 of the Findings
of Fact, which stated:

"That the Plaintiff has retained

Attorney Pete N. Vlahos to represent her and has incurred
reasonalbe [sic] attorney fees and costs."
Because this was not a major disagreement and really
had no impact on the written Conclusions and Decree, counsel
chose to mail the documents with a letter to the Court on
December 3, 1981, asking the Court to strike the said
paragraph in the Findings as he signed all the documents.

There

was no formal motion filed and no further testimony and
argument were necessary because the trial had been completed.
On the same day that the papers were mailed to the trial
judge, the Respondent suddenly died of a heart attack unrelated
to the illness for which he had been hospitalized.
Respondent's counsel immediately petitioned the Trial
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Court for a nunc pro tune order entering the Divorce Decree.
The Court upon hearing argument and briefs of counsel,
granted the nunc pro tune order, making the divorce effective
as of the date of the hearing and oral order, to-wit:
October 27, 1981.

The effect of said hearing was to deny

the Appellant the position of a surviving spouse in the
Respondent's intestate probate estate.

Therefore~

she could

not claim the position of personal representative or statutory
interest as a surviving spouse in the Preece family farm,
thus allowing the family farm to pass under the intestate
law to the Respondent's three natural born childreri_from a
previous marriage and leaving to the Appellant her claim
against the estate for the amount awarded to her by Judge
Christoffersen after the trial on her divorce complaint.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT
A DECREE OF DIVORCE BY MEANS OF A NUNC
PRO TUNC PETITION.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58A(d) specifically
provides for such a case and states:
If a party dies after a verdict or.decision
upon any issue of fact and before Judgment,
judgment may nevertheless be rendered
thereon.
The authority of a court to enter a judgment nunc pro tune
exists at common law and is not dependent upon statute.

The

powers of discretion should not be exercised where to do so
would injuriously affect the intervening rights of third
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parties or otherwise cause injustice.

But on the other

I

hand, should be exercised where injustice would occur if not
done and where the material facts were decided in the manner
recognized by law.
97, 98, 196 and 223.

See 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, paragraphs
The Trial Court in this case, on which·

sat the trial judge who heard the divorce matter, granted
the Petition after considering the file, hearing arguments
of counsel, certainly had the jurisdiction and power to
grant the Divorce Decree as a judgment nunc pro tune, under
the rule cited above, and supplemented by the inherent power
of the Court under common law.
II
THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
ENTERING THE JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC IN
THIS CASE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
A. THE MATTER BE rWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
FULLY AND COMPLETELY ADJUDICATED AT A
TRIAL AND A FINAL ORDER HAD BEEN GRANTED,
WITH THE SOLE REMAINING ACTION BEING
MERELY TO SIGN THE PAPERS.
1

B. GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WILL
OCCUR IF THE COURT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE
THE JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC, AS SUCH ACTION
WILL AWARD AN INTEREST TO A LONG-TIME
FAMILY FARM TO THE APPELLANT,
A WIFE OF SHORT DURATION, AND ACQUIRED
PRIOR TO THIS MARRIAGE AS AGAINST
RESPONDENT'S NATURAL CHILDREN WHO WANT TO
CONTINUE THE FAMILY FARMING OPERATION.
C. THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT IN
HER BRIEF THAT THERE WERE STILL UNDECIDED
ISSUES BEFORE THE DECREE COULD BE SIGNED
WAS NEVER PROPERLY RAISED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE THE APPELLANT
SHOULD BE FORECLOSED OF RAISING THAT ISSUE
ON APPEAL.
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A. THE MATTER BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
FULLY AND COMPLETELY ADJUDICATED AT A
TRIAL AND A FINAL ORDER HAD BEEN GRANTED,
WITH THE SOLE REMAINING ACTION BEING
MERELY TO SIGN THE PAPERS.
The issue of divorce and the property settlement
between the parties was fully litigated on October 27, 1981,
and the verbal order of the Court was made, making the
Divorce Decree final between the parties subject only to the
documents being drafted by the attorneys and signed by the
Court.

The parties had been separated and living apart for

over two years after only three years of marriage.

The only

matter still pending was the signing of the documents by the
Court after a question had been resolved over the appropriateness
of paragraph 9 of the Findings.

Appellant's attorney at

trial presented evidence of attorney fees (Trial Transcript,
pp. 22-23), but the Court clearly ordered each party to pay
their own attorney fees (Trial Transcript, p. 82, and Appellant's
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 9, and Decree of Divorce,
paragraph 8).

There were no motions filed.

The prepared

documents were submitted to the Court with a request to
strike paragraph 9 of the Findings as they were not Findings
made by the Court.
or oral argument.

There was no need of any further testimony
The Court could decide by checking the

record.
It is for a case like this that Rule 58A(d), Utah
Rules of civil Procedure, cited above and the use of nunc
pro tune orders are really designed to meet.

Numerous state

courts have followed this procedure.
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In the case of In re Tahery, 14 Wash.App. 27, 540 P.2d
474 (1975), the Court found that the trial court has the
inherent discretionary power to enter judgment nunc pro tune
even with a divorce action.

The Court also cited equitable

considerations in granting the nunc pro tune order and cited
the following from H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations,
384 (1968):
One final rule governing parties to
divorce suits says that the death of
a party at any time before the entry of
the final decree abates the action
automatically. This result occurs even
though the death foll.ows an interlocutory
decree of divorce.
It does not, however,where the case was fully adjudicated so
that a final decree should have been
entered before the death of a party but
the decree was not in fact entered for
some reason.
In this unusual situation
a divorce decree nunc pro tune may be
entered.
(Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the
case of Cameron v. Cameron, 105 w.va. 621, 143 S.E. 349
(1928}, held that a decree of divorce nunc pro tune was
proper where, as in our case, everything had been done but
for the signing of the papers.

That Court noted the difference

where the decree was interlocutory and death occurred before
it was scheduled to become final.
The Supreme Court of Ohio cited the article at 104 ALR
654 at page 664 as authority for a similar holding in the
case of Caprita v. Caprita, 145 Ohio St. 5, 60 N.E.2d 483
(1945):
The general rule, so far as a general
rule may be deduced from the few cases
falling within this subdivision, is that, if
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the fac~s ~ustifying the entry of a decree
were ad]ud1cated during the lifetime of the
parties to a divorce action, so that a
decree was rendered or could or should have
been rendered thereon immediately, but for
some reason was not entered as such on the
judgment record, the death of one of the
part~e~ to the action subsequently to the
rendition thereof, but before it is in fact
entered upon the record, does not prevent
the entry of a decree nunc pro tune to take
effect as of a time prior to the death of
the party.
The cases cited thereafter support Respondent's position
in this case.
Appellant's cases are not in point.

The cases of

Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Mich. 620, 41 N.W. 817 (1889)} Sahler v. Sahler

17 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1944); and Heil v. Rogers, 369 s.W.2d 388
(Kansas City Ct. of Appeals, Missouri 1959), involved cases
where the matter was still under advisement or no final
pronouncement was made when a party died.

In the case of

State ex rel Tufton v. Superior Court, 46 Wash. 395, 90 P.
258 (1907), the Court relied on the long delay by the party
seeking relief and ruled he was estopped.

The case of

Mabry v. Baird, 203 Okla. 2112, 219 P.2d 234 (1950), actually
allowed the divorce decree to be entered and allowed additional
evidence on the issue of attorney
hearing after death.

fee~

to be included in a

The case of Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884

(Utah 1975), involved a case where death occurred during the
interlocutory period.

That is different from this case

where the Court waived the interlocutory period and made
the Decree final upon signing.
cited above.

See Cameron v. Cameron,

The undersigned submits that if the Court,
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despite this clear distinction, finds that the Daly case is
controlling, then this Court should overrule

the~

case

and follow Rule 58A(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
leave the matter to the discretion of the Trial Court, which
is in a better position to decide whether a death before the
final docketing of the final order is a sufficient change of
circumstances to warrant a change, of the oral order.
Finally, the case of Glad v. Glad, 567 P.2d 160 (Utah
1977), involved filing motions objecting to Findings and
Conclusions.

This case involved a letter to the Court to

strike one paragraph from the Findings as not being covered
by the ruling of the Court.

It may have delayed the actual

signing of the papers for several days but in light of the
long separation of the parties and the case being decided at
the trial this short delay was meaningless.
This case was as final after the hearing on October 27,
1981, as a divorce case can be.

The attorneys had even

agreed on the wording for the Conclusions of Law and the
Decree.
B. GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WILL
OCCUR IF THE COURT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE
THE JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC, AS SUCH ACTION
WILL AWARD AN INTEREST OT A LONG-TERM
FAMILY FARM TO THE APPELLANT,
A WIFE OF SHORT DURATION, AND ACQUIRED
PRIOR TO THIS MARRIAGE AS AGAINST
RESPONDENT 1 S NATURAL CHILDREN WHO WANT TO
CONTINUE THE FAMILY FARMING OPERATION.
It appears to the undersigned that the sole reason that
the Appellant objects to the nunc pro tune order is to get a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

greater share of the Respondent's estate as his surviving
widow than she received under the Divorce Decree after the
trial.

There appears no desire to return and operate the

family farm or help Respondent's children as their stepmother.
Appellant herself sought to have the divorce made final upon
the hearing, indicating as grounds for the divorce her
problems with Respondent's children (Trial Transcript, p.
70).

In not sustaining the Trial Court's action, this Court

would increase the Appellant's claim against Respondent's
estate from the $14,605 set at trial to one-half of the
Respondent's estate(§ 75-2-102(1)(3) Utah Code Ann. (1953)
as amended}, of which the family farm at least is included
with an appraisal value as of October 27, 1981, of $143,000
(Ex. 3), to the detriment of the three natural children of
the Respondent, who, without the claim of the Appellant,
would inherit the family farm.

Respondent could have prevented

this by a will or prenuptial agreement, but as happens in so
many cases, he certainly had no foreknowledge of a divorce
or a sudden death.

His hospitalization was not life-threatening.

A divorce action is one of equity.

The rules clearly

provide that the Court has the power to enter a Divorce
Decree where judgment was rendered but not signed before
death.

By sustaining the action of the Trial Court, the

natural object of a person's family farm went to the persons
that Respondent would want it to go to.
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C. THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT IN
HER BRIEF THAT THERE WERE STILL UNDECIDED
ISSUES BEFORE THE DECREE COULD BE SIGNED
WAS NEVER PROPERLY RAISED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE THE APPELLANT
SHOULD BE FORECLOSED OF RAISING THAT ISSUE
ON APPEAL.
The undersigned directs the Court to the issues raised
by the Appellant in resisting the Respondent's motion for a
judgment nunc pro tune (see Court File, pp. 43-60).

Appellant

claims basically that the Court is without jurisdiction to
grant such an order because of Respondent's death before
the Divorce Decree was signed (Court's File, pp. 43-60).
Further, in the transcript of the oral argument held before
the Trial Court on February 1, 1982, with H. Don Sharp
appearing for Appellant, the parties outlined their position
before the Court.

No mention is made of the claim that

there were still unresolved issues.

The sole claim was that

Respondent's death before the actual papers were signed made
the oral judgment stated at the conclusion of the trial
void.

The claim in Appellant's brief of substantial unresolved

issues with the written documents is a new claim raised
before the Supreme Court for the first time.

This Court has

clearly held that issues raised for the first time on appeal
are not considered and therefore this Court can disregard
that portion of the Appellant's argument.

See Turtle Management,

Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah
1982).
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CONCLUSION
This is a case where the judgment nunc pro tune was
properly granted and where the Trial Court, which should and
does have discretion to take this proper action, was clearly
justified by the record.

The Trial Court had the advantage

of reviewing the long-time separation, the different assets
owned by the parties, the number of ·marriages, the finality
of the divorce they were seeking, and the equity of the
parties as to where the family farm asset should go with
Respondent's sudden untimely death.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

-

'_) ...-..day of July, 1982.

HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON

Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

:11__

day of July, 1982, I

mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing REPLY BRIEF by placing same in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:
Pete N. Vlahos
Vlahos, Perkins & Sharp
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

Secretary
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